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Studies of culturally-based phenomena 
within neuroscientiﬁ  c frameworks repre-
sent one of the most dynamic tendencies 
in contemporary cognitive science. They 
have provided the foundations of social 
neuroscience, which comprise studies on 
brain correlates of social cognition, abili-
ties, and disabilities (Cacioppo, 2002), 
and have contributed to the consolidation 
of evolutionary neuroscience as a multi-
disciplinary epistemological ﬁ  eld, which 
frequently involves social neuroscientiﬁ  c 
topics, considered in terms of their func-
tion and evolutionary basis (for an authori-
tative introduction and discussion: Platek 
et al., 2007).
The new horizons that these studies 
revealed now allow for neuroscientiﬁ  c 
approaches to topics that once were con-
ceived to be beyond the scope of a natu-
ralistic framework, because they remained 
subordinated to contingent dimensions of 
the cultural environment (e.g., embodi-
ment; Campbell and Garcia, 2009).
Such efforts have widened the scope of 
social neuroscience and raise very inter-
esting perspectives for evolutionary neu-
roscience, in terms of the adaptations and 
brain circuits that appear to lie at the base 
of these phenomena, as well as suggest 
an incursion into a dialogue with studies 
pointing in the opposite direction, which 
question the bases of certain universal cog-
nitive and behavioral phenomena that are, 
by and large, thought of in terms of their 
functional basis – like Everett et al. (2005) 
did in relation to universal grammar, when 
arguing that the Pirahã language has no 
recursion, no subordination, no numeral, 
and “in effect, no phrase structure” (Everett, 
2007, p. 4); and like Henrich et al. (2010) 
did in their critical review of research on 
“WEIRD” people (“Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich and Democratic”), 
which they claim to have biased several 
generalizations about “human nature”, 
from perception (e.g., different stand-
points in relation to the Mueller-Lyer illu-
sion) to abstract cognition (e.g., egocentric 
vs.   geocentric reasoning styles in tasks 
  requiring spatial cognition)1.
The study of the relation between  culturally-
speciﬁ  c phenomena and brain activity has 
been named neuroanthropology (a term 
coined by E. D. Lewis, from the University of 
Melbourne) and  proposes to be “the study of 
the experiential and neurobiological aspects 
of cultural  activity” (Dominguez Duque et al., 
2009, p. 3). Considered within this perspec-
tive, it seems compelling to assume that we are 
moving into the era of neuroanthropology 
(see: Campbell and Garcia, 2009), where the 
tradition of studies of culturally-dependent 
phenomena meets the tradition of study-
ing brain mechanisms to consolidate a new 
epistemological ﬁ  eld. However, the thesis that 
this paper endorses is that the consolidation 
of neuroanthropology as a new and legiti-
mate epistemological tradition will require 
 signiﬁ  cant new efforts.
The ﬁ  rst thing that is important to bear 
in mind is that the authority of new ﬁ  elds 
of research rely on the premise that they 
introduce new lines of research, which can-
not be perfectly characterized within the 
epistemological structure of a previously 
established ﬁ  eld of research (Kuhn, 1977). 
Many anthropologists conduct research 
within natural science frameworks, such 
as social and evolutionary neuroscience, 
and up to this point there was no clear rea-
son to consider that these works represent 
new epistemological traditions, since these 
studies are all committed to the questions, 
methods, and theories that are dear to the 
natural sciences.
Hence, it follows that the emergence of 
neuroanthropology as a concept announc-
ing something new implies that these stud-
ies introduce methods and questions of 
interest to the social sciences – especially 
anthropology, which has been argued “to be 
a philosophical holdout against ‘reduction-
ist’ neuroscience” (Campbell and Garcia, 
2009, p. 1).
Such questions of interest to social 
anthropologists represent the real challenge 
of neuroanthropology. The reason for this 
difﬁ  culty is the same that warrants neuroan-
thropology as a potential breakthrough. 
Unlike evolutionary neuroscience and other 
multidisciplinary ﬁ  elds of research where 
both parts are committed to the princi-
ples and methods of the natural sciences, 
neuroanthropology presents a difﬁ  culty in 
bridging the gap deﬁ  ned by the different 
interests and ‘hard problems’ established 
within the bounds of social neuroscience 
and of social anthropology. The ﬁ  eld relies 
on the great importance that social anthro-
pology historically has attributed to that 
which neuroscientists call contingencies, 
when deﬁ  ning the necessary and sufﬁ  cient 
conditions for certain culturally-speciﬁ  c 
phenomena to emerge. This focus auto-
matically raises related issues, and hence 
evokes ‘hard problems’ that can only be 
resolved by very speciﬁ  c ‘neuroanthropo-
logical’ studies.
In order to expose this thesis, I propose 
to discuss one feature in Campbell’s and 
Garcia’s (2009) paper, related to the subjec-
tive experience of the body (embodiment) 
and its association to both cultural determi-
nants and to neurobiological correlates. As 
the authors emphasize, this bodily represen-
tation makes reference to a traditional topic 
of interest in social anthropology (Csordas, 
1990), which can also be thought of in terms 
of somatic representations in the brain. As 
pointed out by the authors, recent studies 
(e.g., Craig, 2009) suggest that embodiment 
involves insula activity, which in association 
with the anterior cingulate activity repre-
sents one of the most prominent brain cor-
relates of long term meditation, yoga, and 
ritual experiences, like the altered percep-
tions induced by Ayahuasca.
In principle, the combination of these 
ideas is straightforward: it is possible to 
include some discussion on brain corre-
lates within the anthropological studies on 
embodiment in the same way that it is possi-
ble to turn this into a valid discussion within 
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the scope of social neuroscience. However, 
there is a gap between this valid conclusion 
and the concerns that turn embodiment 
into one of the ‘hard problems’ of social 
anthropology, as posed by Csordas (1990), 
whose interests in the matter investigate 
the speciﬁ  c experiences of evil and divine 
within the healing practices of the char-
ismatic Christians in North America, and 
the disclosure of the elements that lead to 
the uniqueness of the phenomenon under 
study. According Csordas, “physiological 
explanations in terms of trance and altered 
states of consciousness, or catharsis and 
nervous-emotional discharge, do not take 
us very far unless we are willing to accept 
trance and catharsis as ends in themselves 
rather than as modus operandi for the work 
of culture” (Csordas, 1990; p. 32).
Considering this example as one that can 
characterize the tensions that underlie the 
emergence of this new ﬁ  eld, neuroanthro-
pology has to contribute with an under-
standing of the variables that condition 
the phenomena in speciﬁ  c conjunctures, 
neutralizing the caveats that were placed 
by Csordas, nearly two decades before this 
discussion takes place. This is not to say 
that a strong multidisciplinary engagement 
between neuroscience and anthropology is 
not achievable. Below I present examples of 
possible lines of research on embodiment 
(also considered as an example) that can 
meet the necessary and sufﬁ  cient conditions 
of a strong sense of multidisciplinarity that 
have been described above:
(1) What exactly changes in the brain of 
someone from a certain ethnic group 
while he engages in a mystic experience, 
and to what extent does it resemble the 
brain changes that occur in members 
of other communities, who partake 
in similar practices? In other words, 
are there any brain signatures that can 
help to discern embodiment from one 
cultural context to another?
(2) Are there any qualitative or quantita-
tive differences in brain dynamics in 
the trance of a spiritual leader and of a 
follower? If so, can these differences be 
reduced to the ones commonly found 
in relation to social status within an 
urban environment?
(3) Do brain correlates of speaking in 
tongues resemble those of normal 
language? If not, what are the core 
neurological differences and to what 
anthropological tenets are they most 
likely associated?
(4) Are there differences in patterns of 
brain activation within mystical expe-
riences among members of groups 
that use ritual drugs (e.g. Ayahuasca), 
as compared to members of groups 
that do not use them? To what extent 
do differences in brain activation pro-
duced by different ritual drugs corre-
late with different ritual practices?
(5)  Is there a difference in the brain dyna-
mic between a subject using a ritual 
drug outside of a ritual (e.g. during a 
brain scan experiment in a hospital) 
and within the ritual context (e.g. the 
MRI scanner is taken to the ﬁ  eld)?
In conclusion, the development of 
studies focused on the potential neuro-
biological differences/similarities between 
individuals who occupy different roles 
in a community and also studies on the 
social and biological differences/similari-
ties between communities are part of the 
scope of   neuroanthropology, while studies 
on brain activity alone (e.g., brain correlates 
of embodiment as a general idea) are not 
part of this new ﬁ  eld, whose two distinct 
players need to partake in a thoughtful 
methodological dialogue in order to arrive 
at a common goal.
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